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THE “EXCEPTIONALLY TROUBLING” MURDER CONVICTION OF JOSE GARCIA
Matthew Bosher*
In the summer of 1991, Jose Garcia was visiting his
wife’s family in Matanzas, Dominican Republic.1 On July 15,
1991, having decided to return to his home in the Bronx, Garcia
went to the La Union International Airport in Puerto Plata,
Dominican Republic and attempted to board a flight for JFK.
Garcia had no legal status in the United States, however, and
before he boarded his flight, Dominican immigration officials
detected his false travel papers. Garcia was arrested and spent
the night of July 15 in a Puerto Plata jail.
The next day, Garcia’s wife, Ana Ortega, traveled from
Matanzas to Puerto Plata and paid Garcia’s bail. Garcia was
released that afternoon, and, together with his wife, he returned
to her family’s home in Matanzas. That night – July 16, 1991 –
Garcia attended a prayer service in Matanzas in memory of a
local woman who died a few days earlier. Many members of
Ortega’s family also attended the service and spoke with Garcia
and Ortega.
Around midnight on July 16, Garcia and Ortega were
awakened by Ortega’s friend, Alsacia Encarnacion. Because
Ortega’s family home had no phone service, Encanacion occasionally received calls from New York for Garcia. She had
received such a call, and she told Garcia and Ortega that it was
urgent. Garcia returned the call from Encarnacion’s home and
learned that his close friend, Cesar Vasquez, had been murdered
in the Bronx earlier that night.
Garcia remained in the Dominican Republic for several weeks before returning to the U.S. Once back in the U.S.,
Garcia was arrested and charged with the murder of Cesar
Vasquez. Garcia naturally told his attorney and anyone else that
would listen that he had been in jail in the Dominican Republic
until the afternoon on July 16 – the date of the murder – and that
he spent the rest of that night (and the subsequent weeks) in the
Dominican Republic. In spite of his apparently ironclad alibi,
on January 8, 1993, a Bronx jury convicted Garcia of the second degree murder of Cesar Vasquez and he was sentenced to
serve twenty-five years to life in prison.
The principal reason Garcia was convicted for a murder he could not possibly have committed was that the jury
heard virtually nothing regarding his alibi. Garcia’s trial counsel believed that the State’s case was weak and that he did not
need to conduct any meaningful pre-trial investigation or prepare a defense. To make matters worse, the Bronx District
Attorney’s Office did nothing to confirm or investigate Garcia’s
alibi – which was disclosed to them almost a year before trial –
thereby failing to fulfill a prosecutor’s basic affirmative duty to
“make sure they do not convict the innocent.”2 The combination of his trial counsel’s ineffectiveness, and the Bronx District
Attorney’s irresponsible handling of his prosecution took sixteen years from Garcia.
Yet, Garcia may actually be among the fortunate. As
set forth below, Garcia’s conviction has now been set aside but
that only came about as a result of a series of fortuitous events
and coincidences. Garcia’s case illustrates the near-impossibility of post-conviction relief even for those prisoners who, like
Garcia, are plainly and demonstrably innocent.
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Post-Conviction Proceedings
Garcia’s 1993 conviction kicked off fourteen years of
appellate proceedings in both state and federal court. The New
York Appellate Division denied Garcia’s direct appeal in 1995,
and, the following year, the Court of Appeals denied his petition
for leave to appeal.3 Next, and by this point operating pro se,
Garcia filed for a writ of error coram nobis vacating the
Appellate Division’s decision on the bases of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, but that too was denied in 1998.4
In August 2000, Garcia pursued the last remedy available in New York courts, a motion to vacate his conviction. In
that motion, Garcia argued that his trial counsel had been constitutionally ineffective by, among other things, failing “to
interview or present alibi witnesses at trial and to obtain documentary evidence in support” of his alibi.5 In support of his
argument, Garcia attached papers documenting his incarceration in the Dominican Republic the day of the murder and statements of witnesses able to testify as to Garcia’s presence in the
Dominican Republic shortly before the murder, at the time of
the murder, and shortly after the murder.6 The Bronx Supreme
Court summarily denied the motion on December 7, 2000 in a
cursory, hand-written order: “Evidence submitted does not tend
to establish defendant’s alibi. A review of the trial record fails
to substantiate allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel.
No other argument presented has demonstrated a sufficient
basis to consider any further review.”7 There was no marshaling of the facts or relevant law, just those three conclusory sentences. Leave to appeal to the Appellate Division was denied.8
Garcia’s only remaining recourse was federal court
and the “great writ” of habeas corpus. Garcia – still operating
pro se – filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus in April
2002, arguing, principally, that his trial counsel had rendered
ineffective assistance. The Bronx District Attorney moved to
dismiss the petition because it was not filed within the one year
statute of limitations.9 Garcia argued that his petition should
not be dismissed for a mere procedural defect because he
demonstrated a credible claim of actual innocence, which warranted a toll of the statute of limitations. United States
Magistrate Judge Kevin Fox rejected the argument and recommended that the petition be dismissed.10
Garcia was almost out of options. Enter Judge Lewis
Kaplan, United States District Court Judge for the Southern
District of New York. Although not known generally as prodefense or a civil libertarian, Judge Kaplan is an extremely
meticulous and fair jurist.11 Moreover, Judge Kaplan has
demonstrated that he has no compunction about overturning
established prosecutorial conventions in the interests of fundamental fairness as he did in his now famous decision in U.S. v.
Stein.12
Garcia’s good fortune in having his case assigned to
Judge Kaplan went further than just Judge Kaplan’s scrupulousness. In reviewing the petition and Magistrate Fox’s recommendation to dismiss it, Judge Kaplan’s eye surely settled on
the identity of Garcia’s trial counsel. At the time Judge Kaplan
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was considering the petition, Garcia’s trial counsel was acting
before Judge Kaplan in an unrelated immigration proceeding.
In that other matter, Batista-Taveras v. Ashcroft,13 Judge Kaplan
ultimately determined that the trial counsel’s performance was
“grossly ineffective,” and his representation of his client was so
“grossly deficient” that the client was denied due process.14
The Batista-Taveras opinion was issued in September
2004. It was also in September 2004 that Judge Kaplan revived
Garcia’s habeas corpus petition and, along with it, Garcia’s pursuit of justice.15 That Garcia’s trial counsel (and his incompetence) was a known quantity to Judge Kaplan at the very time
Garcia’s petition was under review was a critical – and extraordinarily fortuitous – fact in Garcia’s favor.
Judge Kaplan remanded the matter to Magistrate Fox,
required the Bronx District Attorney to respond to the petition
on the merits, and appointed habeas counsel for Garcia.16
Garcia’s habeas counsel immediately began to investigate and
requested an evidentiary hearing on the petition. On February
16, 2005, Magistrate Judge Fox granted the request for an evidentiary hearing. This was a critical moment; evidentiary hearings are only convened in approximately 2% of habeas cases
but a petitioner’s odds for ultimate relief skyrocket when a hearing is ordered.
The Ineffective Trial Counsel’s Failure To Investigate
And Present The Alibi
Garcia’s burden at the evidentiary hearing was to
demonstrate that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of Garcia’s 6th Amendment rights.
The standard is set forth in the Supreme Court’s opinion
Strickland v. Washington:17 counsel’s assistance is constitutionally deficient when (1) “counsel’s representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness” and (2) “there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different but
for counsel’s unprofessional errors.”18
Garcia’s trial counsel agreed to testify and he was
Garcia’s first witness at the evidentiary hearing. His testimony
as to Garcia’s alibi was unequivocal: “I believed at the time of
Garcia’s state court trial, and I believe today, that Garcia was in
the Dominican Republic at the time of Vasquez’s murder.”19 As
to why the jury at Garcia’s trial heard virtually nothing of this
alibi, the trial counsel explained that he did not investigate or
prepare the alibi defense because, among other reasons, (1) he
believed the government’s single-witness case was weak and
(2) any investigation was constrained by costs and time.20
While Garcia’s trial counsel made critical errors during the trial, his fundamental failure was the lack of a prompt
and diligent pre-trial investigation. What Garcia’s trial counsel
failed to do in 1992, his habeas counsel did in 2005 for purposes of the evidentiary hearing. Through numerous meetings with
Garcia’s family and associates and a thorough investigation in
the Dominican Republic, Garcia’s habeas counsel created a
documentary record consisting of, among other things:
(1) a copy of Garcia’s Dominican national identity
card, authenticated through Ortega’s testimony, bearing Garcia’s photograph and national identity number;
(2) an arrest intake form, identifying Garcia by name
and national identity number, showing that Garcia was
arrested in the Dominican Republic on July 15, 1991;
(3) a Dominican bail document ordering Garcia’s
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detention until payment of bail, which Ortega testified
she was given at the Puerto Plata courthouse after paying Garcia’s bail and presented it at the police station
to obtain his release;
(4) a copy of an airline ticket in the name Ferdinand
Caraballo for a flight on June 22, 1991 from New York
to Puerto Plata, with a return flight scheduled for July
18, 1991, which Garcia testified was given to him
immediately before his arrest at the Puerto Plata airport on July 15, 1991;
(5) a receipt for the airline ticket, attached to a declaration of the president of Anabella Tours, Inc., a travel
agency located in Bronx County, that the receipt was
made during the regular course of the agency’s business, maintained in the agency’s records: and
(6) a photocopy of an unused boarding pass for a July
15 flight from Puerto Plata to New York, again in the
name Ferdinand Caraballo, which Garcia testified he
received at the Puerto Plata airport on July 15, shortly
before being arrested for attempting to travel with
false documents.21
All of these documents that were located in 2005 – and presumably many more given the likelihood that, over time, some documents were lost or destroyed – existed in 1992-1993 but
Garcia’s trial counsel made no effort to locate them and the jury
knew nothing about them.22 Assessing this evidentiary record
at the October 26, 2006 hearing, Judge Kaplan observed “if the
Dominican documents are what they purport to be and are true,
the odds that he could have committed that murder are slim to
zero. Forget all the other evidence.”23 In other words, the documentary record compiled by habeas counsel was alone sufficient to exonerate Garcia.
But there was more. At trial, Garcia’s counsel did not
put on a witness who could testify to firsthand knowledge of
Garcia’s presence in the Dominican Republic on the night of the
murder. Garcia’s habeas counsel produced an overwhelming
body of testimonial evidence demonstrating that Garcia
remained in the Dominican Republic after his release from jail
on July 16, 1991, the day of the murder. At the evidentiary
hearing, seven witnesses specifically testified that Garcia was in
the Dominican Republic on the night of July 16 (or shortly
thereafter),24 and four affidavit witnesses placed Garcia in the
Dominican Republic a few days after July 16.25 If Garcia committed the murder as the jury concluded, all eleven of these witnesses were lying under oath. But the jury in 1993 heard from
none of these witnesses, not because they were unavailable or
unwilling to testify but because Garcia’s trial counsel – who
admits he was aware of some of these witnesses – never even
interviewed them prior to trial.26
Following the evidentiary hearing, Magistrate Judge
Fox – and later Judge Kaplan – concluded that Garcia’s trial
counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness because he failed (i) “to present alibi evidence
known to him at the time,” and (ii) “to investigate Garcia’s
whereabouts on” the day of the murder.27 The failure to investigate was particularly damaging; “Representation of a criminal
defendant entails certain basic duties, one of which is to investigate the facts of the case so that counsel can prepare a reasonably informed defense.”28 Judge Kaplan stated emphatically
that Garcia’s trial counsel failed to perform that basic duty:

Criminal Law Brief

sure that it did not convict the innocent. Almost a year before
Any reasonable defense attorney in [trial counsel’s]
Garcia’s trial began, Garcia’s trial counsel informed the District
position certainly would have undertaken some invesAttorney’s Office that Garcia had been incarcerated in the
tigation into the defendant’s whereabouts at the time of
Dominican Republic for attempting to travel with false papers
the crime. . . . After learning that his client was in the
around the time of the crime. The trial counsel encouraged the
Dominican Republic only hours before the crime was
District Attorney’s Office to investigate the alibi and dismiss
committed, Guttlein should have investigated where
the case.
Garcia went next. His duty was to investigate, not to
The extent of the District Attorney’s Office’s effort
make do with whatever evidence fell into his lap.29
was a March 4, 1992 letter requesting information from the U.S.
Moreover, such a failure to investigate is not excused
Department of State regarding the passport and tourist card
by the relative weakness of the government’s case. Noting that,
Garcia was carrying when he was arrested in the Dominican
while, under the Strickland standard, great deference is given to
Republic. Specifically, the assistant District Attorney asked:
a defense counsel’s strategic decisions, Judge Kaplan stated “a
(1) “when and where [the passport and tourist card]
decision not to prepare an adequate defense because a defense
were issued”;
lawyer thinks the prosecution’s case is weak is not ‘strategic.’
(2) “In what name these documents were issued”;
It is motivated by the desire to avoid work, not to serve the best
(3) “Where these documents are today,” noting his
interests of the defendant.”30 Nor do the costs31 and time32
“reason to believe they may have been confiscated on
associated with a pre-trial investigation excuse a failure to perJuly 15, 1991 in the Dominican Republic”; and
form it.
(4) for copies of the passport and tourist card.39
In light of the wealth of new documentary and testimonial evidence proffered at the
“Any reasonable defense attor- Importantly, the letter did not mention police
habeas evidentiary hearing, the second prong of
ney in [trial counsel’s] position reports or arrest and release records. The State
the Strickland standard was easily satisfied: certainly would have undertaken Department provided the following response
“There is little doubt that the alibi evidence, had some investigation into the defen- regarding “Garcia, Jose”:
INQUIRIES WITH DOMINICAN POLICE
it been produced at trial, would have altered the dant’s whereabouts at the time of
AND IMMIGRATION REVEALED THAT
landscape substantially. The decision of a jury
the crime. . . His duty was to
THE SUSPECT WAS ARRESTED 7.15.91
that did not weigh this evidence is not reli- investigate, not to make do with
33
IN SANTO DOMINGO WHILE TRYING
able.”
whatever evidence fell into his
TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY WITH
Accordingly, on December 21, 2006,
lap.”
“FALSE DOCUMENTS.” DOCUMENTS
Judge Kaplan determined, as had Magistrate
- Judge Kaplan
INCLUDING PASSPORT WERE SEIZED
Fox before him, that Garcia’s trial counsel renBY IMMIGRATION AND SENT TO
dered constitutionally defective assistance of
POLICE.
UNFORTUNATELY THE POLICE HAVE
counsel. Garcia’s petition was granted, subject to the State’s
LOST
ALL
THESE DOCUMENTS.40
right to re-try him within sixty days.
That was the end of the inquiry.41 Incredibly, the Bronx District
The Irresponsible District Attorney’s Failure
Attorney’s Office never asked for or received any information
To Investigate The Alibi
or documents relating to Garcia’s arrest, incarceration or
release.
Garcia’s trial counsel’s failure to investigate and presNine months later, at the beginning of Garcia’s trial for
ent Garcia’s alibi denied Garcia his constitutional entitlement to
murder, the prosecuting Assistant District Attorney attempted to
effective assistance, but blame for the miscarriage of justice of
explain the exchange with the State Department to the court but
Garcia’s conviction does not rest with the trial counsel alone.
did so inaccurately:
As discussed in the last two issues of the Criminal Law
[W]hen the District Attorney’s Office contacted the
Brief journal, a prosecutor’s job is not simply to win.34 The
Dominican Republic to get the police reports that were
prosecutor’s duty is twofold: to ensure that “guilt shall not
the underlying supposedly arrest information, our
escape or innocence suffer.”35 The prosecutor’s responsibility
Embassy or in effect someone is notified . . . that the
to ensure that innocence does not suffer is not a new developpolice reports down there don’t exist there. They were
ment; courts have held for more than a century that “it is as
lost. . . . They were lost down in the Dominican
much the duty of the district attorney to see that no innocent
Republic. There are no reports as to actually his arrest
man suffers as it is to see that no guilty man escapes.”36 The
that exist, to my knowledge. We called them and the
American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional
Embassy checked into it and the reports don’t exist
Conduct suggest an affirmative obligation on the part of prosedown there. The passport he used with a different
cutors to uncover “sufficient evidence” for a determination of
name it’s gone. Everything is gone from down there.
guilt or innocence: “A prosecutor has the responsibility of a
*
*
*
minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate. This
If the embassy checked, and were told by the police
responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that the
department down there that the records are lost, which
defendant is accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decidis exactly what we were told, the police reports were
ed upon the basis of sufficient evidence.”37 Indeed, as a former
lost, we are not duty bound to keep chasing after peoJustice of the U.S. Supreme Court concluded, this affirmative
ple down there in the hopes that may be they will find
obligation means prosecutors must “make sure they do not
them. The bottom line was the inquiry was made and
convict the innocent.”38
The Bronx District Attorney’s Office did not make
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we were informed by the police department down
there that they lost them. They don’t have any of the
reports that were generated on his arrest.42
But that is not what happened. The Department of State notified the District Attorney that the documents seized from Garcia
were lost, not the police reports of his arrest. And the police
records documenting Garcia’s arrest, incarceration, and release
were not lost and do exist – Garcia’s habeas counsel found
them. The District Attorney’s Office never looked for them nor
even asked for them and, worse, then suggested to the court that
it had in fact done so. That such an inquiry was not made cost
Garcia sixteen years of his life.
While the Bronx District Attorney’s conduct was not
technically the basis for any relief granted to Garcia, the point
was not lost on Judge Kaplan. At the hearing on the District
Attorney’s objections to Magistrate Fox’s Report and
Recommendation, Judge Kaplan focused on the District
Attorney’s Office’s failure to fulfill its “obligation to justice”:
“If you call what you did investigating to the best of your ability, then I hope your commitment to justice isn’t of the same
caliber. . . . [S]ending a letter to the State Department, and
accepting an uncorroborated one-page response, when the issue
is what records exist in the Dominican Republic is, with all due
respect, a joke.”43 Perhaps even more troubling to Judge
Kaplan was the District Attorney’s failure to perform any investigation of Garcia’s alibi in connection with the habeas proceeding. At the October 26, 2006 hearing, Judge Kaplan asked
what the District Attorney’s office had done in response to “the
bundle of Dominican documents” proffered at the evidentiary
hearing supporting Garcia’s alibi. When the Assistant District
Attorney responded the District Attorney’s Office had done
essentially nothing, Judge Kaplan reacted:
You made no effort whatsoever. You’ve got a guy who
served 15 years in jail for murder, in circumstances
where if the Dominican documents are what they purport to be and are true, the odds that he could have
committed that murder are slim to zero. Forget all the
other evidence. And the district attorney in Bronx
County has done nothing to try to find out whether
they are on the level?44
It is difficult to say which was the more pernicious
conduct: trial counsel’s malfeasance or the District Attorney’s
Office’s nonfeasance. It is plain, however, that a prosecutor’s
responsibility to the innocent is a first principle in the maintenance of the criminal justice system. Where, as here, a prosecutor demonstrates complete indifference to a fully exonerating
defense, irreparable injustice may follow.
An “Exceptionally Troubling” Case
Judge Kaplan characterized Garcia’s plight as “an
exceptionally troubling case,” inasmuch as, “In all probability,
it resulted in a conviction and fifteen years in prison that otherwise would not have occurred.”45 Garcia’s trial counsel’s failure to investigate and the Bronx District Attorney’s lack of
interest in his alibi robbed Garcia of sixteen years, his wife of
her husband and his four children of their father.
In this case, some measure of justice, albeit belatedly,
has been done. Perhaps more troubling are the other cases.
Garcia was fortunate in many ways. His petition was assigned
to an attentive, meticulous district court judge, who assigned
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habeas counsel with the resources to investigate and document
a fourteen-year-old alibi. Garcia was also fortunate that documents still existed in support of his stale alibi and that witnesses still recalled it. Garcia also had family – in particular, his
wife – standing behind him to assist in the complex investigation undertaken by habeas counsel. Finally, Garcia’s trial counsel agreed to testify at the evidentiary hearing and conceded his
pre-trial mistakes rather than defend his conduct and his reputation. Many innocent prisoners do not have such advantages
in attempting to make their case.
In fact, obtaining post-conviction relief may turn not
on a rigorous process of truth-seeking but on a fortuitous aligning of the stars. Garcia’s case demonstrates the point. Two different justices of the New York Supreme Court, the Appellate
Division of the New York Supreme Court (twice), the New York
Court of Appeals, and a Federal Magistrate Judge each passed
– in most instances, in perfunctory fashion – on an opportunity
to scrutinize Garcia’s claim of innocence before Judge Kaplan
stepped in and reversed the tide. As for Judge Kaplan, one wonders whether an extremely busy federal judge would have
devoted the time and energy to the case but for his contemporaneous experience with Garcia’s trial counsel in an unrelated
immigration proceeding. This was perhaps the decisive advantage for Garcia – and an utter coincidence.
And that is what is “troubling” about Mr. Garcia’s
case. While he has been vindicated, it took a remarkable series
of events to undo the murder conviction wrought by an incompetent defense counsel and an irresponsible prosecutor. Most
are not so lucky.
* Matthew Bosher, a former associate at Willkie Farr &
Gallagher LLP, represented Jose Garcia in connection with
his habeas corpus petition. The views expressed in this article
are Mr. Bosher's and not necessarily those of Willkie Farr &
Gallagher. Mr. Bosher can be reached at:
mbosher@alumni.virginia.edu.
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